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Abstract 
 
This working paper is divided into two parts. Firstly, we develop a new 
combined equilibrium model of business land-use, which puts travelers’ traffic 
equilibrium and business companies’ competitive location equilibrium into a unified 
framework. A variational inequality is presented for the combined equilibrium and the 
properties of equilibrium solution are investigated. Secondly, the congestion pricing 
principles associated with the combined equilibrium are studied. From the 
mathematical point of view, we prove that there exists an optimal road pricing scheme 
that can minimize the social cost of travelers. This road pricing scheme generalizes 
the traditional link-based optimal road pricing scheme. Furthermore, when 
simultaneously imposing charges on travelers and companies is allowed, we prove 
that there exists an optimal congestion pricing scheme that can derive a combined 
equilibrium toward an overall system optimum. The economic meaning of every 
pricing scheme proposed in this paper is discussed in detail. At last, a simple 
numerical example is used to demonstrate that the optimal congestion pricing scheme 
may indeed reduce the social cost. 
 
Keywords: Traffic; Competitive location; Business land-use; Congestion pricing; 
Business congestion tax. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Traffic congestion is one of the basic characteristics in the development of 
modern city. The development of modern economy derives a great amount of travel 
demand, which is often close to or even reaches the physical capacity of the whole 
traffic system and leads to broad traffic congestion. Recently, many metropolises are 
becoming more and more crowded and there is not enough space to expand the 
physical capacity of urban transportation system to reduce the congestion. Thus, 
drawing support from scientific management methods provides government with an 
alternative solution to mitigate traffic congestion. Congestion pricing, as a particular 
method, has been put into practice to effectively control traffic congestion. In 
academic field, there have been many studies on road congestion pricing. For a 
comprehensive review of classical mathematical theories and methods of road pricing, 
please see the monograph (Yang and Huang, 2005). The current researches about road 
pricing in the literature mainly focus on the more practical and complicated scheme 
design of road pricing (e.g. Hamdouch and Lawphongpanich, 2010; Yang, Xu, He and 
Meng, 2010; Lawphongpanich and Yin, 2012), the welfare effect of road pricing 
policy on social groups with different income levels (e.g. Wu, Yin and 
Lawphongpanich, 2011; Wu, Yin, Lawphongpanich and Yang, 2012), the congestion 
management with tradable credits (e.g. Yang and Wang, 2011; Wang et al., 2012; Wu 
et al., 2012) and so on. 
A potential restriction of traditional road pricing policy to mitigate congestion is 
that it can not fundamentally alter the travel demand pattern in the network i.e. the 
travel demands between different O-D pairs in the network. The travel demand pattern 
is mainly determined by the land-use pattern while the road pricing policy can 
significantly change the travelers’ travel route choices but only influence the number 
of travel demand slightly between a given O-D pair. Therefore, in order to 
fundamentally mitigate traffic congestion, we should explicitly consider the influence 
of the land-use pattern on the travel demand pattern of urban road network. 
The close relationship between transport and land use has been recognized and 
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studied for decades. For the research results in recently years, we refer to Briceño et al. 
(2008), Bravo et al. (2010), Meng et al. (2009), and Ma and Lo (2012), just to name a 
few. As far as we are concerned, almost all of the researches about the interactions 
between transport and land use in existing literature are limited to consider the 
behaviors of the group of travelers, though some classified the travelers into several 
kinds (e.g. Bravo et al., 2010). However, the trip distribution is not merely determined 
by travelers themselves but also clearly affected by the business location distribution 
i.e. the number of business companies located at every business center of the network. 
Indeed, if every destination of the network is supposed to be a business center, then 
the trip attraction at each destination to travelers (consumers) obviously increases 
with the number of business companies in this destination. From consumers’ view, 
more business companies imply more shopping options and greater shopping 
convenience. Plenty of companies within a prosperous business center, for example, 
can always attract many travelers (consumers) even when the center itself and the 
paths leading to the center have been crowded. Additionally, it can be observed that a 
business center would attract many business companies to join with high rental rates 
if the number of travelers gathering in this center is large. The reason is that more 
consumers mean more potential business opportunities for business companies. Thus, 
the business location distribution pattern of companies and the trip distribution pattern 
of travelers can affect each other, and these effects should not be ignored. Furthermore, 
the business location distribution pattern is influenced by the congestion pricing 
policy as well. For example, if congestion tolls are set on the roads leading to a 
business center, then some previous customers of this business center may go to 
others. As a result, the original business competitive location equilibrium among 
different business centers in the network is broken, which will promote the business 
companies to relocate. This means that the change of business location distribution 
pattern, in the long term, will take place and influence the trip distribution of travelers 
in turn. Consequently, it makes sense to study the combined equilibrium of business 
land-use, which consists of business competitive location and transport system, and 
investigate corresponding congestion pricing principles. To the best of our knowledge, 
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however, the mathematical analysis of the combined equilibrium of business land-use 
remains open, let alone the investigation of its congestion pricing principles.  
The aim of this working paper is to investigate the combined equilibrium of 
business land-use by putting business competitive location equilibrium and traffic 
equilibrium into a unified framework, and derive corresponding optimal congestion 
pricing schemes. We first propose a new way of congestion pricing---business 
congestion tax policy, which imposes an extra tax on the companies in every business 
center of the network. Specifically, we charge the companies in the business centers 
which are too crowded or attract too many travelers (consumers) to result in network 
congestion, and provide subsidies for the companies in the business centers which 
attract relatively fewer travelers (consumers). This policy is to urge a portion of 
companies in original crowded business centers to relocate to other uncrowded 
business centers so as to balance the companies’ distribution in different business 
centers. Thus every business center’s attraction measure for travelers would change 
and fundamentally influence their destination choices. As a result, the traffic demands 
between different OD pairs would be balanced, the travelers would not gather at only 
a few business centers and the network congestion would be fundamentally mitigated. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we firstly give the 
definition of combined equilibrium of business land-use. The combined equilibrium 
consists of two sub-equilibriums---parametric traffic equilibrium and parametric 
business competitive location equilibrium which are dependent on each other. Two 
parametric variational inequalities are presented for these two sub-equilibrium 
problems. Integrating the two parametric variational inequalities together, we obtain a 
new variational inequality model equivalent to the combined equilibrium issue. With 
the help of this variational inequality, we confirm the existence and uniqueness of the 
combined equilibrium under some mild assumptions. In Section 3, we prove there is a 
road pricing scheme which can support a combined equilibrium as a traffic system 
optimum and give its mathematical formulas. Next, we describe the reasonability of 
the business congestion tax policy and prove that there exists an optimal congestion 
pricing scheme that includes both road pricing and business congestion tax to 
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minimize the total social cost of travelers and business companies. The potential 
economic meaning of every pricing scheme is discussed. A simple numerical example 
is offered in Section 4 to demonstrate that the congestion pricing scheme consisting of 
road pricing and business congestion tax may indeed reduce the social cost. Finally, 
Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Model and mathematical formulations  
 
2.1 Definition of combined equilibrium  
 
The main goal of this section is to establish the mathematical models for the 
combined equilibrium of business land-use and prove its existence and uniqueness. It 
is assumed throughout the paper that every traveler in the network is a consumer who 
desires to choose the “optimal” destination and the fastest path leading to this 
“optimal” destination to go shopping. Now we list the terminologies and symbols 
used throughout this paper. 
Consider a general network ),( AVG  , together with N  as node set and A  
as directed link set. Let O , D  respectively denote the origin set and the destination 
set. For any DsOr  , , let 
rsR  denote the set of all simple routes between OD  
pair rs . The total travel demand starting from origin node Or   is assumed to be 
fixed and given by rO . Let 
T
rs DsOrqq ),,(   be the vector of travel demands 
where 
rsq  is the travel demand between OD  pair rs , 
T
s Dsdd ),(   be the 
vector of destination demands where 


Or
rss qd  is the number of travelers choosing 
s  as their destination, Trs
rs
k DsOrRkff ),,,(   be the vector of path flows 
where rskf  is the traffic flow on path rsRk  and 
T
a Aaxx ),(   be the vector of 
link flows where 
ax  is the traffic link flow on directed link Aa  . The symbol 
rs
ak  
equals 1 if link a  is on path rsRk , otherwise equals 0. Let )( aa xt  be the 
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separable travel time function of link a  which is dependence of link flow ax . 
Throughout this paper, every destination node Ds  is assumed to be a business 
center in the network. Let T
s Dshh ),(   denote the vector of business flows, 
where 
sh  is the number of business companies locating in business center Ds . 
We set that T  is the number of total business companies in the network, so 



Ds
shT . In particular, T  is assumed to be a constant strictly greater than zero. For 
any destination node Ds , we respectively denote ),( sss hdA  as the trip attraction 
function of s  for travelers and ),( sss hdB  as the business attraction function of s  
for business companies. These two functions both depend on 


Or
rss qd  and sh . 
Let 1K  be the set of all feasible trip distribution patterns defined by:  













 
  
AaDsOrRk
dqxfOqqff
dqxfK
rs
s
Or
rs
Or
a
Ds Rk
rs
k
rs
akr
Ds
rsrs
Rk
rs
k
rs
k
rsrs
,,,
,,,,0
),,,(1

, 
2K  be the set of all feasible business location patterns defined by:  






 

DsThhhK
Ds
ss ,,02 . 
We introduce the following assumptions throughout this paper: 
Assumption 1. For any link Aa  , the travel time function )( aa xt  is set to be 
separable, convex, continuous differentiable and strictly increasing of 
ax .       □ 
Assumption 2. For any Ds , the destination attraction function for travelers, 
),( sss hdA  is continuous differentiable of 
T
ss hd ),( , strictly decreasing of sd , 
strictly increasing of sh  and strictly concave with respect to sd .              □ 
Assumption 3. For any business center Ds , the business attraction function for 
business companies, ),( sss hdB  is continuous differentiable of 
T
ss hd ),( , strictly 
increasing of 
sd  and strictly decreasing of sh .                            □ 
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Assumption 4. Throughout this paper, we suppose that the functions )( aa xt , 
),( sss hdA  and ),( sss hdB  have the same unit of measurement. That is to say, we do 
not distinguish between money-based cost and time-based cost in the paper.      □ 
 
Now we formally introduce the definition of combined equilibrium.  
Definition 1. 
Let 1),,,( Kdqxf   and 2Kh , we say ),,,,( hdqxf  is a (logit-based) combined 
equilibrium of business land-use if ),,,,( hdqxf  satisfies: 
exp{ [ ( , )]}
exp{ [ ( , )]}
rs s s s
rs r
rj j j j
j D
v A d h
q O
v A d h



 

 
, DsOr  ,                        (1) 
 

 




rsRj Aa
aa
rs
aj
Aa
aa
rs
ak
rs
rs
k
xt
xt
qf
]})([exp{
]})([exp{


, ;,, DsOrRk rs                   (2) 



Dj
jjj
sss
s
hdB
hdB
Th
)],(exp[
)],(exp[


, Ds                                     )3(  
where , , 0     and 
rsv  is the logit-based expected travel time between OD  
pair rs , i.e. 
1
ln{ exp[ ( ( ))]}
rs
rs
rs aj a a
j R a A
v t x 
  
    . 
Remark: From the equations (1) and (2) in above definition, we know that the 
behaviors of travelers (consumers) have a nested logit choice structure. Additionally, 
by the logit choice theory, we have   . 
 
In this paper, we define that 1),,,( Kdqxf   is the parametric traffic 
equilibrium if ),,,( dqxf  meets (1) and (2), where 2Kh  is viewed as a 
parametric vector. Similarly, we define that 2Kh  is the parametric business 
competitive location equilibrium if h  meets (3), where 1),,,( Kdqxf   is viewed 
as a parametric vector.  
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The goal of Section 2 is to establish the mathematical formulations for the 
combined equilibrium. Our strategy is to firstly divide the combined equilibrium into 
two interdependent parts: parametric traffic equilibrium and parametric business 
competitive location equilibrium and study them separately. Then we would integrate 
them together to derive the model of the combined equilibrium.  
 
2.2 Parametric traffic equilibrium  
 
Now we present a parametric variational inequality for the parametric traffic 
equilibrium problem.  
 
(VI 1) 
Find a vector 
1),,,( Kdqxf 
  such that  
0),,,,( 
















































hdqxfF
d
q
x
f
d
q
x
f
T
, 1),,,( Kdqxf                     )4(  
where 
2),( KDshh
T
s   is viewed as a parametric vector and  
   
1 1 1
( , , , , ) ln , , ( ) ln , , , , , ,
T
rs
k a a rs s s s rsF f x q d h f t x q A d h k R r O s D a A
  
 
       
 
. 
The left term in )4(  can be reformulated as:  
1 1 1
( ) ln ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ln
( ) ( , ) 0
rs
rs rs rs
k k k a a a a rs rs rs
r O s D k R a A r O s D
s s s s s
s D
f f f x x t x q q q
d d A d h
  
     
     
 

     
  
  

 
 
We have the following result: 
Theorem 1. 
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Let 2Kh  and 1),,,( Kdqxf  , then ),,,( dqxf  is a solution of (VI 1) if and only 
if ),,,( dqxf  is a parametric traffic equilibrium.  
 
2.3 Parametric business competitive location equilibrium  
 
Now we proceed to present another parametric variational inequality for the 
parametric business competitive location equilibrium.  
 
(VI 2) 
Find a vector 
2),( KDshh
T
s 
  such that 
0),()(   hdUhh T , 2Kh ,                                      (22) 
where 
T
ssss DshdBhhdU 





 ),,(ln
1
),(

, ),,,( dqxf  is a parametric vector. 
The left term in (22) can be reformulated as: 0)],(ln
1
)[( 


Ds
ssssss hdBhhh

.  
 
We have the following result. 
Theorem 2. 
Let 1),,,( Kdqxf   and 2Kh , then h  is a solution of (VI 2) if and only if, it is a 
parametric business competitive location equilibrium. 
 
2.4 Combined equilibrium of business land-use 
 
So far we have studied the parametric traffic equilibrium and the parametric 
business competitive location equilibrium in a separate way. Now the aim is to put 
them into a framework to derive the model of combined equilibrium.  
 
2.4.1 Variational inequalities formulation  
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In the following, a system of variational inequalities model (VIS 3), which is a 
combination of (VI 1) and (VI 2), is presented for the combined equilibrium.  
 
(VIS 3) 
Find a vector 
21),,,,( KKhdqxf 
  such that  
0),,,,( 
















































hdqxfF
d
q
x
f
d
q
x
f
T
 and 0),()(   hdUhh T ,  
21),,,,( KKhdqxf  , 
where ),,,,(  hdqxfF  and ),(
 hdU  are respectively given in (4) and (22).  
 
To discuss the solution existence of (VIS 3) conveniently, we need to reformulate 
(VIS 3) as a single variational inequality (VI 4) which is defined as follows: 
 
(VI 4) 
Find a vector 
21),,,,( KKhdqxf 
  such that  
0),,,,( 



























































hdqxf
h
d
q
x
f
h
d
q
x
f
T
 , 21),,,,( KKhdqxf              (23) 
where 
 
  







hdU
hdqxfF
hdqxf
,
,,,,
),,,,( . The left term in (23) can be rewritten as 
1 1 1
( ) ln ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ln
1
( ) ( , ) ( )[ ln ( , )] 0
rs
rs rs rs
k k k a a a a rs rs rs
r O s D k R a A r O s D
s s s s s s s s s s s
s D s D
f f f x x t x q q q
d d A d h h h h B d h
  

     
     
      
 
      
     
  
 
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Proposition 3. 
Suppose 
1),,,( Kdqxf 
  and 
2Kh 
 . Then ),,,,(  hdqxf  is a solution 
of (VIS 3) if and only if it is a solution of (VI 4). 
 
),,,,( hdqxf  is continuous on the compact convex set 21 KK  , so (VI 4) has 
a solution. Therefore, the existence of the combined equilibrium can be confirmed.  
 
2.4.2 Uniqueness of the combined equilibrium  
 
Now we focus on the uniqueness of the combined equilibrium i.e. the solution 
uniqueness of variational inequality (VI 4). The uniqueness of the combined 
equilibrium pattern is significant to the study of optimal congestion pricing scheme. If 
the uniqueness can be confirmed, then the congestion pricing scheme’s effect on trip 
distribution and business location distribution becomes predictable and some 
appropriate pricing scheme can be designed for achieving a target distribution pattern 
of travelers and business companies. To be precise, we have the following result. 
 
Theorem 4. 
The variational inequality (VI 4) has a unique solution if the following two conditions 
are valid for any 21),,,,( KKhdqxf  : 
(1) 0
),(
2
1),(
2
1),(









s
sss
s
sss
s
sss
d
hdB
h
hdA
d
hdA
, Ds ; 
(2) 0
),(
2
1),(
2
1),(









s
sss
s
sss
s
sss
h
hdA
d
hdB
h
hdB
, Ds . 
 
Remark: According to the equivalence between (VI 4) and the combined equilibrium 
issue, it follows that if the assumptions in Theorem 4 are valid, then the combined 
equilibrium must be unique. 
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Let us consider some practical implications of the assumptions in Theorem 4. 
Firstly, suppose that 
s
sss
s
sss
d
hdB
h
hdA




 ),(),(
 is valid for any Ds . That is to say, 
in business center s , consumers’ marginal shopping utility with respect to sh  equals 
to companies’ marginal location utility with respect to sd . This simplification can 
enable us to derive the practical implications of the assumptions in Theorem 4. Then 
the first assumption in Theorem 4 can be rewritten as  
0
),(),(






s
sss
s
sss
h
hdA
d
hdA
, Ds .               (25) 
From consumers’ point of view, the inequality in (25) can be explained that the value 
of marginal congestion disutility 
s
sss
d
hdA



),(
 is larger than the value of marginal 
shopping utility 
s
sss
h
hdA

 ),(
. In other words, the consumers think the additional 
congestion cost of increasing one more unit of consumers in s  exceeds the 
additional benefit of increasing one more unit of companies in s . On the other hand,  
)1(
),(
)1(
),(
),()1,1( ss
s
sss
ss
s
sss
ssssss hh
h
hdA
dd
d
hdA
hdAhdA 





  
s
sss
s
sss
h
hdA
d
hdA






),(),(
. 
Thus the inequality in (25) can also be regarded as that the attraction of business 
center s  to consumers would decrease if one more unit of consumers and one more 
unit of business companies enter s  in the same time. In addition, the second 
assumption in Theorem 4 can be rewritten as 
                  0
),(),(






s
sss
s
sss
d
hdB
h
hdB
, Ds .               (26) 
Similarly, the inequality in (26) is to say that the business companies think the 
additional land rent cost of increasing one more unit of companies in s  exceeds the 
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additional benefit of increasing one more unit of consumers in s , or the attraction of 
s  to companies would decrease if one more unit of consumers and one more unit of 
companies enter s  in the same time. From previous discussion, the prerequisites in 
Theorem 4 may demonstrate some cases in practice. They can be valid for the very 
congested business center in which there are numerous consumers and companies. In 
such business center, the marginal disutility of aggregation effect exceeds the 
marginal utility of aggregation effect for not only consumers but also companies.  
 
3. The congestion pricing principles based on the combined equilibrium 
 
The objective of this section is to investigate the congestion pricing principles 
based on the combined equilibrium. This section is divided into two parts. The first 
part aims at deriving the optimal road pricing scheme that can support a parametric 
traffic equilibrium as a “uniform” traffic system optimum. This means that the total 
social cost of travelers can achieve minimization. The second part is devoted to 
studying the general optimal congestion pricing scheme which consists of road 
pricing and business congestion tax. The goal of the scheme is to minimize the total 
social cost of travelers and business companies. 
 
3.1 The optimal road pricing scheme  
 
Now we are going to derive the optimal road pricing scheme that can minimize 
the total social cost of travelers. According to Yang’s work (Yang, 1999), the total 
social cost of travelers in this paper can be measured as the total cost of travel time 
minus the travelers’ benefit 
1 1 1
(ln 1) ( ) (ln 1) ( ) ( , )
rs
rs rs
k k rs rs a a a s s s s
r O s D k R r O s D a A s D
f f q q x t x A d h d
        
         , 
where T
s Dshh ),(   is the parametric vector. 
Clearly, the parametric traffic system optimum requires the total social cost of 
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travelers to be minimized based on current business location distribution 
T
s Dshh ),(  . So we have the following parametric optimization problem. 
 
(OP 5) 
, , ,
1 1 1
min (ln 1) ( ) (ln 1) ( ) ( , )
rs
rs rs
k k rs rs a a a s s s s
f x q d
r O s D k R r O s D a A s D
f f q q x t x A d h d
        
        
  1,,,.. Kdqxfts   
 
The above optimization model reflects the government’s expectation that the travelers 
in the network consciously choose their destinations and travel routes to minimize 
their total social cost based on T
s Dshh ),(  . The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this 
optimization problem are 
exp{ [ ( , )]}
exp{ [ ( , )]}
rs s s s
rs r
rj j j j
j D
v A d h
q O
v A d h



 

 
, DsOr  ,                       (27) 
 

 




rsRj Aa
aa
rs
aj
Aa
aa
rs
ak
rs
rs
k
xt
xt
qf
]})([exp{
]})([exp{


, DsOrRk rs  ,,                 (28) 
where 
rsv  is the Lagrange multiplier and 
1
exp{ [ ( )]}
rs
rs
rs aj a a
j R a A
v t x 
  
    , 
)(ˆ)()( aaaaaa xtxtxt  , ),(
ˆ),(),( sssssssss hdAhdAhdA  ,               (29) 
where 
s
sss
ssss
d
hdA
dhdA



),(
),(ˆ , 
a
aa
aaa
dx
xdt
xxt
)(
)(ˆ  .  
According to 0
)(

a
aa
dx
xdt
 and 0
),(



s
sss
d
hdA
, it follows that 
0)(ˆ aa xt , 0),(
ˆ sss hdA ,  
)()(ˆ)()( aaaaaaaa xtxtxtxt  ,                                       (30) 
),(),(ˆ),(),( ssssssssssss hdAhdAhdAhdA  .                          (31) 
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Obviously, )( aa xt  and ),( sss hdA  are respectively the actual travel time of the link 
a  and the actual attraction measure of the business center s  for travelers. From the 
point of view of travelers, the travel time is disutility and the destination attraction 
represents utility. Thus, from (30) and (31), ),(ˆ sss hdA  and )(ˆ aa xt  can be viewed 
as the negative externalities which stem from the effect of congestion on the links and 
the business centers in the network. That is to say, ),(ˆ sss hdA  is the additional 
congestion disutility that a traveler imposes on all other travelers in s  while )(ˆ aa xt  
is the additional travel time that a traveler imposes on all other travelers in a . 
Furthermore, note that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for (OP 5), namely (27) and (28), 
include the negative externalities and have the same forms as the parametric traffic 
equilibrium conditions if the link travel time function and the destination attraction 
function for travelers in (1) and (2) are replaced by )( aa xt  and ),( sss hdA  in (29). 
Therefore, by imposing a toll that exactly equals to the corresponding negative 
externality on each link and each business center’s entrance, we can ensure that the 
travelers’ optimal private travel choices, which include destination choices and route 
choices, will also be “relatively optimal” choices according to the minimization of 
total social cost of travelers. The word “relatively” refers to that the optimality is 
based on the current business location distribution T
s Dshh ),(  . Evidently, the 
“relatively optimal” road pricing scheme is not qualified because this scheme is still 
dependent on the business location distribution.  
Now the aim is to derive the uniform optimal scheme, which is independent of 
the business location distribution. Firstly, we should verify how travelers and 
companies would act respectively if the desired road pricing policy is carried out. 
Before establishing the mathematical model, we need to prove that (OP 5) is 
equivalent to its stationary point problem, which is given below.  
 
(VI 6) 
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Find a vector 
1),,,( Kdqxf 
  such that 
( )1
( ) ln ( )[ ( ) ]
( , )1 1
( )( ) ln ( )[ ( , ) ] 0
rs
rs rs rs a a
k k k a a a a a
r O s D k R a A a
s s s
rs rs rs s s s s s s
r O s D s D s
dt x
f f f x x t x x
dx
A d h
q q q d d A d h d
d

 

    
   

    
  
   

      

 
 
,  
                                                      1),,,( Kdqxf  . 
 
Note that there is a parametric vector T
s Dshh ),(   in (VI 6), which indicates 
the influence of the location distribution of business companies. When only the road 
pricing policy is allowed to carry out, we can not expect the companies to consciously 
act according to the will of the government since the road pricing policy has no direct 
influence on them. The business companies’ location distribution is still based on the 
principle of personal utility maximization. Thus the behaviors of companies can still 
be described by (VI 2) under the policy of road pricing. By the equivalence between 
(OP 5) and (VI 6), it follows that now the behaviors of travelers and companies can be 
precisely depicted by the following system of variational inequalities, which is a 
combination of (VI 2) and (VI 6). 
 
(VIS 7) 
Find 
1),,,( Kdqxf 
  and 
2Kh 
  such that 
( )1
( ) ln ( )[ ( ) ]
( , )1 1
( ) ( ) ln ( )[ ( , ) ] 0
rs
rs rs rs a a
k k k a a a a a
r O s D k R a A a
s s s
rs rs rs s s s s s s
r O s D s D s
dt x
f f f x x t x x
dx
A d h
q q q d d A d h d
d

 

    
   
 
     
  
    

       

 
 
,  
0)],(ln
1
)[( 


Ds
ssssss hdBhhh

,                 1),,,( Kdqxf  , 2Kh .  
 
It is easy to prove that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of (VIS 7) are just (3), (27) and 
(28). Since the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a variational inequality with linear 
constraints is equivalent to the variational inequality itself (Facchinei and Pang, 2003), 
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the equations (27), (28) and (3) give a complete and accurate characterization of the 
behaviors of travelers and companies under the road pricing policy. Therefore, by 
comparing (27) with (1) and (28) with (2) respectively, we can obtain the following 
uniform optimal road pricing scheme which can ensure that the total social cost of 
travelers achieves minimization over all possible business location distribution 
patterns in the state of equilibrium.  
 
The uniform optimal road pricing scheme 
(a) Find the global optimal solution ),,,( dqxf  of following optimization problem:  
, , ,
1 1 1
min (ln 1) ( ) (ln 1) ( ) ( , )
rs
rs rs
k k rs rs a a a s s s s
f x q d
r O s D k R r O s D a A s D
f f q q x t x A d h d
        
        
 hdqxfts ,,,,..  belongs to the solution set of (VIS 7). 
(b) For any link Aa , any traveler using this link will be charged a fee that equals 
to 
a
aa
a
dx
xdt
x
)(
. 
(c) For any Ds , any traveler entering this business center will be charged a fee 
that equals to 
s
sss
s
d
hdA
d



),(
. 
Remark 1: Step (a) is to select the best equilibrium solution that can uniformly 
minimize the travelers’ total social cost from all possible equilibrium solutions. If the 
solution of (VIS 7) is unique, then the step (a) would be is simplified as “Find the 
unique solution of (VIS 7)”.  
Remark 2: Since ),( sss hdA  is strictly decreasing with sd , 0
),(




s
sss
s
d
hdA
d . 
So the step (c) is to charge the travelers, not to provide them with subsidies. 
 
The traditional link-based optimal road pricing scheme is just the subscheme (b) 
of the uniform optimal road pricing scheme. The differences between the traditional 
scheme and the uniform optimal scheme result from the fact that the traditional 
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scheme assumes the business location distribution pattern is given in advance without 
considering the important influence of the business location distribution. Hence, 
within the theoretic framework in this paper, the traditional scheme can not derive a 
combined equilibrium toward a uniform traffic system optimum or even a “relative” 
traffic system optimum which depends on the business location distribution (the 
“relative” traffic system optimum is depicted by the parametric optimization problem 
(OP 5)). Thus the uniform optimal road pricing scheme generalizes the traditional 
link-based optimal road pricing scheme.  
 
3.2 The optimal congestion pricing scheme that consists of road pricing and business 
congestion tax 
 
The objective of this part is to derive the optimal congestion pricing scheme that 
contains road pricing and business congestion tax. The scheme should consider the 
social cost of both travelers and companies because the business congestion tax has a 
direct influence on the income of companies and the business location distribution 
pattern. At first, we would like to point out the rationality of the business congestion 
tax policy which aims at the group of business companies. It can be asserted that the 
business companies should also be partly responsible for the congestion since the 
aggregation of business companies may influence the trip distribution of travelers. In 
fact, from a mathematical point of view, by (1) and (2), we have: 
 


 








rsRj Aa
aa
rs
aj
Aa
aa
rs
ak
Dj
jjjrj
sssrs
r
rs
k
xt
xt
hdAv
hdAv
Of
]})([exp{
]})([exp{
)]},([exp{
)]},([exp{




, 
DsOrRk rs  ,, . 
Clearly, the above equality indicates that the traffic flow on every path in the network 
depends on the location distribution of business companies. Therefore, the traditional 
road pricing scheme may be unfair to the travelers because the scheme only charges 
them. Thus the business congestion tax policy is necessary and reasonable.  
Now we start to establish the model for the overall system optimum under the 
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policy of road pricing and business congestion tax. The model should reflect the 
principle on which the consumers and business companies jointly insist, as we expect, 
to minimize the total social cost of travelers and companies. Based on this idea, we 
present the following optimization model. 
 
(OP 8) 
, , , ,
1 1 1 1
min (ln 1) ( ) (ln 1) (ln 1) ( )
rs
rs rs
k k rs rs s s a a a
f x q d h
r O s D k R r O s D s D a A
f f q q h h x t x
         
         
      


Ds
ssss
Ds
ssss hhdBdhdA ),(),(  
  21,,,,.. KKhdqxfts   
 
The economic implication of (OP 8) is similar to that of (OP 5). Now we want to 
show that solving the optimization problem (OP 8) leads to the desired optimal 
congestion pricing scheme. It is easy to prove that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of (OP 
8) are 
exp{ [ ( , )]}
exp{ [ ( , )]}
rs s s s
rs r
rj j j j
j D
v A d h
q O
v A d h



 

 
, DsOr  , ,                      (32) 
 

 




rsRj Aa
aa
rs
aj
Aa
aa
rs
ak
rs
rs
k
xt
xt
qf
]})([exp{
]})([exp{


, DsOrRk rs  ,, ,                (33) 



Dj
jjj
sss
s
hdB
hdB
Th
)],(exp[
)],(exp[


, Ds ,                                   (34) 
where 
rsv  is the Lagrange multiplier and 
1
ln{ exp[ ( ( ))]}
rs
rs
rs aj a a
j R a A
v t x 
  
    , 
s
sss
s
s
sss
sssssss
d
hdB
h
d
hdA
dhdAhdA






),(),(
),(),( ,                    (35) 
a
aa
aaaaa
dx
xdt
xxtxt
)(
)()(  ,                                          (36) 
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s
sss
s
s
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hdB
h
h
hdA
dhdBhdB





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),(),(
),(),( .                    (37) 
In above equations, ),( sss hdA  and ),( sss hdB  are respectively the actual attraction 
measure for travelers and companies in the business center s . The economic 
implications of the other terms in (35), (36) and (37) are given below. 
1. 
s
sss
s
d
hdA
d

 ),(
 is the additional congestion disutility that a traveler imposes on all 
other travelers in the business center s .                                 (38) 
2. 
s
sss
s
d
hdB
h

 ),(
 is the additional business benefit that a traveler brings to the 
companies in the business center s .                                    (39) 
3. 
a
aa
a
dx
xdt
x
)(
 is the additional travel time that a traveler imposes on all other 
travelers in the link a .                                               (40) 
4. 
s
sss
s
h
hdA
d

 ),(
 is the additional consuming utility that a company brings to the 
travelers who choose the business center s  as their destination.              (41) 
5. 
s
sss
s
h
hdB
h

 ),(
 is the additional land rent cost that a company imposes on all other 
companies in the business center s .                                    (42) 
Therefore, the terms in (39)-(42) can be treated as the externalities due to the 
aggregation effect of travelers and companies in the network. To internalize the 
externalities, a toll should be imposed on each link and each business center’s 
entrance and it should equals to the corresponding externality. To be precise, we 
obtain the following pricing scheme. 
 
The optimal congestion pricing scheme 
(d) Find the global optimal solution ),,,,( hdqxf  of the optimization problem (OP 
8).  
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(e) For any link Aa , any traveler using this link is charged a fee that equals to 
a
aa
a
dx
xdt
x
)(
. 
(f) For any Ds , any traveler entering this business center is charged a fee that 
equals to ]
),(),(
[
s
sss
s
s
sss
ss
d
hdB
h
d
hdA
du





 . 
(g) For any Ds , any company in this business center is imposed a tax that amounts 
to ]
),(),(
[
s
sss
s
s
sss
ss
h
hdB
h
h
hdA
dv





 . 
 
In general, it is difficult to identify that su  and sv  are positive or negative. 
Therefore, 0su  means that the travelers are charged a fee, 0su  means that the 
travelers are provided with a subsidy, 0sv  indicates that the companies are 
imposed an additional tax, and 0sv  indicates that the companies are given an 
allowance or a tax break. The possible rebate policy in Step (f) can be implemented in 
such a way that every traveler who has shopped in the specified business centers can 
receive the subsidy through providing his/her shopping list to the government. 
Now we further study the economic meaning of the optimal congestion pricing 
scheme. We are especially interested in that of the steps (f) and (g). Firstly, according 
to (38)-(42), 
s
sss
s
d
hdA
d

 ),(
 and 
s
sss
s
h
hdA
d

 ),(
 are respectively the negative 
externality and the positive externality to travelers while 
s
sss
s
d
hdB
h

 ),(
 and 
s
sss
s
h
hdB
h

 ),(
 are respectively the positive externality and the negative externality to 
companies. Secondly, the externalities 
s
sss
s
d
hdA
d

 ),(
 and 
s
sss
s
d
hdB
h

 ),(
 are 
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caused by the aggregation of travelers, and the externalities 
s
sss
s
h
hdA
d

 ),(
 and 
s
sss
s
h
hdB
h

 ),(
 are due to the aggregation of companies. Therefore, in the business 
center s , every individual (a traveler or a company) may simultaneously impose a 
positive external effect and a negative external effect on the overall system. 
s
sss
s
s
sss
ss
d
hdB
h
d
hdA
du






),(),(
 and 
s
sss
s
s
sss
ss
h
hdB
h
h
hdA
dv






),(),(
 
are respectively the overall external effect of a traveler and a company which are 
imposed on the system. If 0 su , it can be asserted that every traveler in s  has a 
positive overall external effect and a rebate policy for the travelers in this center 
should be introduced to compensate the positive externalities. On the other hand, if 
0 su , it indicates that every traveler in s  has a negative overall external effect 
and a charge policy is needed to eliminate the negative externalities. A similar 
discussion about the externalities caused by the aggregation of companies in every 
business center can be taken according to the sign of 
sv . All in all, the core of the 
optimal congestion pricing scheme which includes road pricing and business 
congestion tax can be summarized as the following sentence. 
 
For every individual, if his private choice has a positive overall external effect on the 
system, he will receive a subsidy, otherwise, he will have to pay a toll, and the 
subsidy/toll should be equivalent to the external effect. 
 
4. A numerical example 
 
In this section, we present a numerical example to demonstrate that the optimal 
congestion pricing scheme, which is proposed in Section 3.2, can indeed reduce the 
social cost. We primarily concern how many social costs of overall system can be 
reduced under the pricing scheme, and how the scheme influences the travelers’ trip 
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distribution and the companies’ location distribution. The road network, as shown in 
Fig 4.1, has 6 nodes and 7 links, where node 1 and node 2 are origin nodes, and node 
4 and node 5 are destination nodes (business centers).  
1 4
3 6
2 5
a
b
e
c
d
g
f
Fig. 4.1.
 
The numerical experiments are implemented for twelve scenarios indexed by 
12,...,2,1k , varying the travel demands from every origin node according to 
60,40 12
1
1  OO , 5
1  ks
k
s OO )2,1;12,...,3,2(  sk , and keeping other factors 
unchanged. The total number of companies in the network, T , is set to be 50. The 
numerical results are plotted in the following figures. 
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Fig. 4.2. The descending percentage of total social cost.   
D
e
s
c
e
n
d
in
g
 P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 
 
 24 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
12-Scenarios
Fig. 4.3. Companies' location distribution with toll charge.
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Fig. 4.4. Companies' location distribution with no toll charge. 
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Fig. 4.5. Travelers' trip distribution with toll charge.
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Fig. 4.6. Travelers' trip distribution with no toll charge.
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It can be seen from Fig. 4.2 that the social cost of overall system is reduced for 
every scenario under the optimal congestion pricing scheme. To be specific, the 
descending percentage of social cost of overall system remains close to 60%, which 
indicates that the pricing scheme may be efficient and stable in reducing total social 
cost. Furthermore, by comparing Fig. 4.3 with Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.5 with Fig. 4.6 
respectively, it follows that travelers’ trip distribution pattern and companies’ location 
distribution pattern are more balanced under the optimal congestion pricing policy.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this working paper, we propose a new combined equilibrium model of 
business land-use and investigate its congestion pricing principles. Firstly, the model 
integrates travelers’ traffic equilibrium with business companies’ competitive location 
equilibrium, which can be depicted by two parametric variational inequalities 
respectively. Then by combing them together, we obtain a variational inequality 
equivalent to the combined equilibrium. The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium 
solution are established. Additionally, the mathematical and economic principles of 
congestion pricing associated with the combined equilibrium are studied. 
Mathematically, we prove that there is an optimal road pricing scheme that can 
minimize the social cost of travelers. This scheme generalizes the traditional 
link-based optimal road pricing scheme and reduces the social cost of travelers within 
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a more general framework. Furthermore, if allowed to simultaneously impose charges 
on travelers and companies, we prove that there exists an optimal congestion pricing 
scheme that can derive a combined equilibrium toward an overall system optimum 
according to the minimization of the total social cost of travelers and companies. The 
economic meaning of every pricing scheme proposed in this paper is investigated in 
detail. A numerical example is presented to demonstrate that the previous optimal 
congestion pricing scheme can indeed reduced the social cost. 
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